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THE DEVOLUTION OF IMPLEMENTING POLICYMAKING 
IN NETWORK GOVERNMENTS 
Charles H. Koch, Jr.* 
An undeniable, but often lamented, reality of modem government is that 
substantial policymaking must take place at the implementation stage. 
Legislative and executive authorities simply cannot resolve all policy issues, 
and they often find it politically inadvisable to do so. The danger, of course, is 
that efficiency or expediency will overwhelm the legitimate allocation of 
responsibility between the political authorities and the administrative 
authorities. The balance between democratic legitimacy and effective 
government thus dictates the delegation of the implementing authority. The 
more complex the society and the more complicated the demands on 
government, the more elusive this balance becomes. 
Legal principles regulating delegations of authority suggest that authority 
should be delegated based on hierarchy. Yet even in hierarchical systems, 
influence moves not only up and down but also horizontally among the 
decisionmakers and institutions within the system. Moreover, policy is made 
at the lower levels of the hierarchy without the participation of the hierarchy's 
upper reaches. Regardless, not all governments, especially supranational ones, 
can be understood as mere hierarchies. Instead, the realities of governmental 
policymaking are complicated by questions of legitimacy. 
Even more complexity is added when several governmental systems 
combine in some sort of federal organization. Recently, there has been a 
strong movement toward such organizations. Regions and ethnic groups in 
established nations and emerging nations alike are insisting on more autonomy. 
Nations are coming together to form a variety of supranational organizations, 
some quite broad in their mandates. These coordinated governments raise 
increasingly complex implementation and devolution issues. Traditional 
federal systems, such as the United States, have allocated shared authority 
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through a divided federalism in which central and subunit administrative 
hierarchies are formally segregated and their respective powers are more or 
less clearly defined. 1 
In contrast to this traditional federal organizational concept, the European 
Union (E.U.) is built around commingled responsibilities.2 From the 
beginning, the member states have been integrally involved in the 
policymaking from the foundational legislation to implementation. 3 Their 
engagement has only increased over the years, as E.U. institutions tend to give 
the member states implementing discretion through framework measures and 
"soft" laws.4 For these reasons, the E.U. system is most accurately 
characterized as a network, comprised of webs of interrelationships among 
E.U., national, and non-governmental institutions. Walter van Gerven 
observed, "While public authority was traditionally organized pyramidally 
along hierarchical lines, it is now also organized through numerous networks 
of public and private nuclei of power, making power move both vertically and 
horizontally."5 Policymaking influences may combine in a nearly infinite 
variety of forms with policy moving down from the central authority, up from 
the member state governments, and horizontally among the member states and 
their institutions. Even within the E.U. and national institutions, policy 
development is not necessarily hierarchical.6 
1 See John C. Reitz, Political Economy and Separation of Powers, 15 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. 
PRoss. 579, 618 (2006) ('The United States ... has a legislative system that divides lawmaking powers 
among two legislative houses and the President, who has little ability beyond his veto power to control 
legislation. It also has robust judicial review and is a federal state in which the states retain extensive 
lawmaking powers"). 
2 See J.A.E. Vervaele, Counteifeiting the Single European Currency (Euro): Towards the 
Federalization of Enforcement in the European Union?, 8 CoLUM. J. EuR. L. 151, 151 (2002) ("As opposed to 
Nation States, in the European Union there is no complete separation of powers along the lines of the trias 
politico doctrine. The European Union is based on shared governance between the European 
Community/European Union and the Member states, being an integrated community legal order."). 
3 DESMOND DINAN, EUROPE RECAST: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN UNION 56-57 (2004). 
4 See Peter L. Strauss, Rulemaking in the Ages of Globalization and Information: What America Can 
Learn from Europe and Vice Versa, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 645, 676 (2006) ("When the EU has issued a 
"directive," setting framework standards that require implementing measures, these measures are commonly-
but not invariably-taken by Member States subject to EU controls for their adequacy."). 
5 WALTER VAN GERVEN, THE EUROPEAN UNION: A POLICY OF STATES AND PEOPLES 159 (2005); see 
also id. (noting recognition of this fact by the E.U. Commission). 
6 For example, the E.U. Council has nine configurations in which the relevant national ministers 
represent the member states in approving E.U. legislation. Thus, the E.U. policy that is imposed on the 
member states is to some extent created by the common member -state ministers, and perhaps more 
importantly, the combination of the staffs of the member-state departments, the permanent Council staffs, and 
the relevant Commission staff. PETER STRAUSS ET AL., NORM CREATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 16-17 
(2007), http://www .abanet.org/adminlaw/eu/Reports_Rulemak:ing_ 06-07-2007 .pdf. 
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The E.U. network system requires innovations in the concepts and 
strategies of federalism. It exposes challenges in carrying out a unified, 
effective, and legitimate implementation of shared programs. Even though the 
U.S. Constitution aspired to a "more perfect union" among the several states,7 
it has been held to establish an adversarial relationship between the central 
government and its states.8 This divided federalism combined with the 
generally hierarchical allocation of authority presents a useful contrast to the 
E.U. network federalism. Network organization might have advantages and, 
regardless, may best describe many existing and emerging federal systems, 
both national and supranational.9 Hence, the E.U. and U.S. experiences and 
mechanisms offer insights into how to design other federal systems. 10 
I. IMPLEMENTING POLICYMAKING 
Beyond the separation of powers issue, governmental entitles must also 
consider the legitimacy of delegations from the political bodies to the 
implementing bodies. The E.U. has somewhat paralleled the U.S. in accepting 
the necessity of delegating implementing policy. The evolution of the U.S. 
acceptance of that necessity goes back some distance and probably presages 
the ultimate development of E.U. delegation doctrine. 
7 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
8 See Martin H. Redish, The Adversary System, Democratic Theory, and the Constitutional Role of Self-
Interest: The Tobacco Wars, 1953-1971, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 359, 381 (2001) ("While adversary theory plays 
a central role in the history and philosophy of American political theory, its premises also pervade fundamental 
provisions of the United States Constitution."). 
9 Anne-Marie Slaughter developed the idea of network government. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE 
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); see also Anne-Marie Slaughter & David T. Zaring, Networking 
Goes International: An Update (Washington & Lee Pub. Legal Studies Paper No. 2007-12, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=960484 (providing a literature review of the impressive and growing study of network 
governments). 
10 Much of the discussion in this Article is informed by the study of and experience with U.S. 
administrative Jaw. As society grows outside national borders, so too do government and, consequently, 
administrative Jaw. A "global administrative law" is under construction and is recognized as a contributor to 
the study of network governments. Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 9, at 221-22. The leaders of that 
movement observed, 'The construction of a global administrative law is inevitably shaped and constrained by 
existing institutions and principles as well as the shifting patterns of international ordering and the normative 
foundations . . . . Within these constraints, many strategies of institutional design are possible." Benedict 
Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. IS, 53 (2005). 
However, these leaders also cautioned: "Many of the emerging mechanisms of global administrative law stem 
from northern and western initiatives, and any attempt at justifying the need for such a body of law must thus 
face the challenge of intellectual and political bias." 1d. at 5 I. 
170 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57 
U.S. acceptance evolved through a long process. The earliest U.S. case on 
the need to delegate power to the implementing bodies is the 1892 opinion in 
Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark. ll Relying on a case decided early in U.S. 
history, The Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 12 the Supreme Court 
upheld a statute that gave the President authority to impose retaliatory tariffs if 
he "deemed" that American business was being treated unfairly. Justice 
Harlan and a majority of the Court claimed that the President could do nothing 
under this statute but execute the acts of Congress. He claimed that the 
President "was the mere agent of the law-making department to ascertain and 
declare the event upon which its expressed will was to take effect."13 While 
Harlan's opinion suggested limits on the power to delegate, the case is seen as 
early recognition that Congress may delegate policymaking authority. 14 
The evolution of a generous delegation doctrine was slow but inevitable. 
In 1904, the Supreme Court in Buttfield v. Stranahan15 upheld the delegation 
of power in the Tea Inspection Act to the Secretary of the Treasury to establish 
standards of tea purity. Subsequently, in United States v. Grimaud, 16 the 
Court-while analyzing the power of the Secretary of Agriculture to make 
forestry conservation rules-decided to lay down, as a criterion for delegation, 
the notion that Congress may establish a general statutory standard and 
delegate to the executive the power to "fill up the details" by regulation. 17 And 
finally, in J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 18 the Court in 1928 
upheld another tariff statute and established the principle under which 
delegations are approved today: "If Congress shall lay down by legislative act 
an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such 
rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden 
delegation of legislative power."19 Over the years, the Court has accepted very 
general language as satisfying the "intelligible principle" requirement, so that 
II 143 U.S. 649 (1892). 
12 II U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813). 
13 /d. at 693. 
14 See, e.g., Patrick M. Garry, The Unannounced Revolution: How the Court Has Indirectly Effected a 
Shift in the Separation of Powers, 57 ALA. L. REv. 689, 703 (2006) ("Various scholars have declared the Non-
Delegation Doctrine, which was first announced by the Supreme Court in Field v. Clark, to be dead.") 
(footnote omitted). 
15 192 u.s. 470 (1904). 
16 220 u.s. 506 (1911). 
17 /d. at 511. 
18 276 u.s. 394 ( 1928). 
19 /d. at 409 (emphasis added). 
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no challenge is realistically available.20 A vigorous nondelegation doctrine has 
had judicial advocates over the years?1 But, as Justice Blackmun found in 
Mistretta v. United States, 22 "Applying this 'intelligible principle' test to 
congressional delegations, our jurisprudence has been driven by a practical 
understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever 
changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job 
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.'.23 By 
assuming the role to monitor the implementing authority, democratic 
accountability is permissibly removed by one level.24 
The potential for the same devolution of authority in supranational 
organizations can be demonstrated by examining the evolution of delegated 
authority in the E.U. Like in the U.S., the rejection of delegated authority, 
consistent with basic law, failed. Early in the E.U.'s history, delegation of 
policymaking authority seemed to be prohibited?5 In the 1958 case of Meroni 
20 See, e.g., Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 166--67 (1991); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 759 
(1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[l]t is well settled that Congress may delegate legislative 
power to independent agencies or to the Executive, and thereby divest itself of a portion of its lawmaking 
power .... "). A brief adoption of a vigorous nondelegation doctrine, however, occurred in the mid-twentieth 
century. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 
U.S. 388 (1935). Since 1935, the Supreme Court has not invalidated a statute on delegation grounds. 
21 See, e.g., Nat'! Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974); United States v. Robel, 
389 U.S. 258, 274--77 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring in the result); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546,624--
27 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part). Legal scholars tend to favor a strong nondelegation doctrine. See, 
e.g., Bernard W. Bell, Dead Again: The Nondelegation Doctrine, the Rules/Standards Dilemma and the Une 
Item Veto, 44 VILL. L. REV. 189, 197-98 (1999); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: 
A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1406-D7 (2000); Ernest Gellhorn & 
Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 989, 989-92 (1999); David 
Schoenbrod, Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to My Critics, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 731, 731-32 (1999); 
David B. Spence, Managing Delegation Ex Ante: Using Law to Steer Administrative Agencies, 28 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 413, 413-17 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315-16 (2000). 
22 488 u.s. 361 (1989). 
23 /d. at 372. 
24 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 
1749 (2002). Posner and Vermeule state: 
/d. 
Accountability is not lost through delegation, then; it is transformed. Congress is accountable for 
the performance of agencies generally, and people properly evaluate the agencies' 
accomplishments as well as failures when deciding whether to hold members responsible for 
authorizing the agency, or for failing to curtail its power, fix its mistakes, or eliminate it 
altogether. 
25 This discussion builds on ideas that I formulated as part of the European Union Administrative Law 
Project with George Hermann and other administrative law scholars. For additional information on this 
project, see American Bar Association: European Union Administrative Law Project, 
http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/eu/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2007). 
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v. High Authority,26 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) severely limited 
authority delegations. 27 Having been decided very early in the history of the 
European Community, this case set the parameters for delegation in a much 
simpler governmental context. Specifically, the court held that institutions 
may not "confer upon the authority, powers different from those which the 
delegating authority itself received under the Treaty."28 It also held that the 
delegation must involve "clearly defined executive powers the exercise of 
which can, therefore, be subject to strict review in the light of criteria 
determined by the delegating authority."29 The court dictated that the exercise 
of this power "must be entirely subject to the supervision of the [delegating 
institution]."3° Feeling that the delegation would upset the institutional balance 
envisioned in the Treaty unless all these conditions were met,31 the court ruled 
that the delegation "gives those agencies a degree of latitude which implies a 
wide margin of discretion and cannot be considered as compatible with the 
requirements of the Treaty."32 
Still, scholars of European Law argue that limitations on delegation are not 
overly restrictive in reality. In fact, "the Meroni opinion might suggest to U.S. 
administrative lawyers no more restriction than the current state of the U.S. 
nondelegation doctrine."33 For example, if the court is interpreted to require 
"criteria determined by the delegating authority,"34 this requirement would be 
analogous to the "intelligible principle" requirement announced by the 
Supreme Court at the beginning of the twentieth century. 35 However, Meroni 
could be interpreted to require that the delegating institution itself ultimately 
make the decision. This interpretation would explain the court's choice to 
include the language "subject to strict review . . . by the delegating 
authority."36 In short, Meroni's restriction may be interpreted in a variety of 
ways. 
26 Case 9/56, 195711958 E.C.R. 133. 
27 /d. at 151. 
28 /d. at 170. 
29 /d. at 172. 
30 Id. 
31 /d. 
32 Id. at 174. 
33 Charles Koch, Jr., Primer for U.S. Lawyers on European Union Government and Law 28 (Aug. 2007) 
(on file with author), available at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/eu!Primer_ v8-07 .pdf. 
34 Meroni, 195711958 E.C.R. at 172. 
35 See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928). 
36 Meroni, 195711958 E.C.R. at 172. 
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Yet, the Meroni decision's practical impact is overstated. As Geradin and 
Petit assert: "the implications of the Meroni doctrine should not be 
exaggerated."37 Geradin and Petit explain that the court's reliance on 
institutional balance naturally leads to acceptance of delegation to improve the 
quality of the decisionmaking body both by decreasing the workload on the 
delegating entity and by transferring technical issues to experts?8 As such, 
Meroni might be seen as the equivalent to the early U.S. case Field v. Clark, in 
which the Supreme Court upheld a statute that gave the President the authority 
to impose retaliatory tariffs upon a finding that U.S. businesses were being 
treated unfairly?9 Because the Supreme Court found that the President "was 
the mere agent of the law-making department to ascertain and declare the event 
upon which its expressed will was to take effect,"40 the actual opinion could be 
said to limit delegation. Perhaps it presages European doctrinal evolution to 
note that this opinion has, over time, been characterized as an early recognition 
that Congress may make extensive delegations.41 
Arguably, then, E.U. delegation doctrine is evolving in the direction of the 
liberal U.S. doctrine. In contrast, however, devolution of this authority must 
be quite different in the U.S. divided federalism and the E.U. network 
federalism. In the U.S., while the power to create policy is readily conferred 
(expressly or implicitly) on federal agencies, such policymaking is not and 
cannot be conferred on state administrative authorities.42 On the other hand, 
the E.U. network, by utilizing member state administrative authorities, 
necessarily confers substantial policymaking authority on those authorities. 
37 Damien Geradin & Nicolas Petit, The Development of Agencies at EU and National Levels: 
Conceptual Analysis and Proposals for Reform 15 (Monet Working Paper 01/04, 2004), available at http:// 
www .jeanmonnetprograrn.org/papers/04/040 I 0 l.pdf. 
38 /d. at 15-16. 
39 143 U.S. 649, 692-94 (1892) (discussing The Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, I I U.S. (7 
Cranch) 382 (1813)). 
40 /d. at 693, 698-99. 
41 For further discussion of the evolution of the E.U.'s delegation powers, see CARL FREDRIK 
BERGSTROM, COMITOLOGY: DELEGATION OF POWERS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM 
94-97, 302-08 (2005). The ECJ has accepted the delegation of the authority to adopt implementing measures, 
an increasingly large category, so long as the delegation is to either to the Commission or the Council itself 
under the Consolidated Treaty. See European Union: Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union 
and of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 32 I) 135, art. 202 
[hereinafter Consolidated Treaty]. 
42 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,926-27 (1997) (holding that the federal government may not 
"commandeer" state executive institutions and hence may not delegate authority to state executive institutions 
to make implementing policy). 
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II. THE "CHOICE" BETWEEN NETWORK AND DIVIDED FEDERALISM 
The experiences of these two systems, among others, demonstrate that, in 
modem government, delegations of implementing authority are inevitable and, 
the law must evolve to accommodate them. The delegation question then 
becomes largely a practical question. Delegations within a federal system 
complicate these practical considerations. Federal systems always seem to 
face substantial pressure to devolve implementing policy choices to the local 
level. On the other hand, joint action is the raison d'etre for federalism, and 
hence, the lines of authority must facilitate unity. U.S. and E.U. federalism 
approach these problems in nearly opposite ways, and the contrast adds to the 
variety of potential design strategies. 
A. The E. U. Network 
The E.U. "constitutional" structure incorporates member-state 
governmental institutions directly into the E.U. governmental structure. The 
European system relies on a variety of legislative and executive bodies to 
implement E.U. law. At the first level, basic documents, presently treaties, 
were accepted and continue to be reviewed by the member states.43 At the 
second level, legislative institutions controlled by the member states, the 
Council and Commission, are dominant, despite the fact that the directly 
elected European Parliament has gained power over the years.44 The 
legislation passed through this legislative process is generally directed at the 
member states. Some of this legislation, such as "regulations" and "decisions," 
may have "direct effect," whereby they apply directly to citizens and may be 
43 The basic or constitutional documents of the E.U. have been created by the various treaties signed by 
European nations admitted into the Union. These treaties have been consolidated into one unified document. 
See Consolidated Treaty, supra note 41, art. I. So far, a European constitution has failed to gain popular 
support. 
44 Legislative authority is divided among three institutions: Commission, Council, and Parliament. See 
id. art. 251. Parliament has the weakest role, although that role has increased over the years. Most legislation 
today follows the co-decision process. The Commission proposes all legislation. See id. The Council adopts 
legislation from this proposal usually through a weighed voting called "qualified majority," which is generally 
proportioned according to member state populations. See id. The proposal is sent to Parliament which may 
adopt it, whereby the legislation is enacted, or reject it, whereby it fails. See id. If Parliament amends the 
proposal, then the proposal returns to the Council and the Council and Commission develop another proposal. 
See id. If Parliament rejects that proposal as well, then the Council President, with Parliament President, 
convenes a "Conciliation Committee" within six weeks with equal members from the Council and Parliament. 
See id. Again, the Commission enters the process and facilitates reconciliation. If the Committee agrees on a 
')oint text," that text must be approved by the Council and Parliament. See id. If either does not approve the 
joint text, the measure fails. See id. 
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enforced by citizens.45 Nonetheless, these measures, in fact, mostly operate 
through the member states. Other E.U. instruments, such as "directives," 
formally operate only through the member states.46 In sum, even at the central 
legislative level, the member states generally must take steps to give practical 
effect to the E.U. legislation.47 
The actual system for carrying out these constitutional powers commingles 
responsibilities further. The core legislative institution is the Council. Each 
member state is represented on the Council and participates through weighed 
voting depending largely on population.48 However, different individuals 
represent the member states depending on the subject matter at issue. For 
example, all national ministries with agricultural portfolios would constitute 
the Council in meetings dealing with that subject. Therefore, the Council itself 
not only reflects the interests of the member states but joins together those in 
the member states concerned about particular matters. This necessarily results 
in inter-agency conversation establishing one web of the network. 
Even Brussels-based staffs have become part of the network. For example, 
permanent representatives of the member states are called the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and carry on Council affairs one level 
below the Council.49 The committee facilitates a very high level Brussels-
based staff network. On occasions, COREPER members will sit as state 
representatives on the Council and vote to refer a matter to COREPER. 
45 A definition of "direct effect" is the capacity of an E.U. law to confer rights on an individual directly, 
as opposed to through action by the member state. See generally id. art. 72. 
46 However, a so-called "vertical direct effect" compels member-state institutions, as well as their 
legislatures, to implement directives so that national courts and administrators may be bound in practice to 
apply the provisions of directives. PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, E.U. LAW: TEXT, CASES AND 
MATERIALS 208-09 (3d ed. 2003). "Vertical direct effect" has also been referred to as "administrative direct 
effect." /d. 
47 The involvement of the member states allows for special attention to cultural diversity. Protecting 
diversity is an overarching concern of the E.U. Any future constitution-making can be expected to at least 
maintain and perhaps further protect that diversity. See Armin von Bogdandy, Constitutional Principles, in 
PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3, 42-49 (Armin von Bogdandy & Jurgen Bast eds., 2006); 
see also id. at 42 ("Principles protecting diversity became necessary when principles furthering unity began to 
shape reality."). 
48 Less is done by unanimous voting, and more is accomplished by a "qualified majority." See 
Consolidated Treaty, supra note 41, art. 205. 
49 TREVOR C. HARTLEY, EUROPEAN UNION LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 
30 (2004). 
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The E.U. Commission serves several functions. One function is as the 
executive body, thereby operating as an implementing institution.50 In that 
regard, the E.U. Commission interacts with the other E.U. institutions and the 
member state administrative authorities. Each commissioner has a 
"competence" and works with member state administrations across those 
designated interests.51 The commissioners are nominated by a member state 
and often signify a special concern of the member state. 52 The Commission 
formally acts as a "college" in which it discusses and furthers certain policy 
agendas upon which any number of institutional and member state influences 
might work. 53 The Commission also initiates all legislation and reenters the 
legislative process at various points in the negotiations between the Council 
and the European Parliaments.54 Again, this legislative function necessitates 
other webs. In short, the webs around the functioning of the Commission are 
numerous and perhaps beyond identification, even by the Commission itself. 
The European Parliament is directly elected by the citizens of Europe. 
Nonetheless, these elections take place in the member states.55 The Members 
of the European Parliament (MEPs) are designated and seated by parties. 
These parties run the gamut from conservative to liberal. Thus, European 
Parliament also fosters a web among the state parties and pan-European 
parties, as well as officials from those parties. 
Rattling around inside this amorphous governmental system are various 
committees. The Treaty itself establishes a committee to represent local 
interests, "the Committee of the Regions,"56 and a committee to represent 
special interests, "the Economic and Social Committee."57 In addition, a large 
number of "comitology" committees have been constituted to supervise 
50 See JOSEPHINE STEINER, TEXTBOOK ON EEC LAW 16-17 (3d ed. 1992); see also K.K. DuVivier, The 
United States as a Democratic Ideal? International Lessons in Referendum Democracy, 79 TEMP. L. REv. 821, 
854 (2006) ('The European Commission is a quasi-executive body appointed by the governments of each of 
the member states."). 
51 See STEINER, supra note 50, at 16; see also Rafael Leal-Areas, The EU Institutions and Their Modus 
Operandi in the World Trading System, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 125, 145 (2005) (describing the competence of 
the trade commissioner). 
52 See STEINER, supra note 50, at 16. 
53 !d. 
54 !d. 
55 Francis G. Jacobs, Constitutional Control of European Elections: The Scope of Judicial Review, 28 
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1049, 1052 (2005) (noting that "elections are, broadly, organized by the Member States, 
and largely in accordance with national rules"). 
56 Consolidated Treaty, supra note 41, art. 263. 
57 !d. art. 257. 
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implementing measures. 58 The policymaking function of these committees 
will be discussed further below. It suffices here to note that these committees 
provide additional avenues of access and policy influence. Moreover, although 
designed for specialized purposes, they are appointed by the member states and 
result in another type of interaction among those governments. The 
committees then add another web in the E.U. network. 
Even the briefest description of the network, which this is, may not ignore 
the "civil society." European governments, including the E.U., have formally 
invited and facilitated participation by the public interest community, the "civil 
society," and public interest nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The 
Commission has included in this category organizations that are not-for-profit, 
voluntary, have some institutional or otherwise formal existence (as opposed to 
ad hoc and/or informal), are independent (particularly of government), and are 
not pursuing the commercial or professional interests ot their members. 59 To 
date, much of these organizations' influence occurs inside the Commission. 
Thus, the dialogue within a specialist directorate may include private 
organizations.60 Special access to Parliament and the Council is more 
bl . b . 61 pro ematlc, ut growmg. 
The European Council (separate from the above-described Council) is an 
institution in which the member states meet summit-style to discuss more 
general policy.62 In addition, the E.U. presidency (not an individual) passes 
from state to state every six months.63 Together, these institutions tend to 
create yet other webs between the prior and following summits and 
presidencies and among member states supporting or resisting certain pan-
European policies in these forums. 
The court system is nominally more hierarchical than these other 
institutions, but it too has its network aspects. For one thing, an uneasy peace 
58 See Michelle Egan & Dieter Wolf, Regulation and Comitology: The EC Committee System in 
Regulatory Perspective, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 499, 511 (1998). 
59 European Commission, The Commission and Non-Governmental Organizations: Building a Stronger 
Partnership, at 3-4, COM (200) II final (Jan. 2000) (Commission discussion paper, on file with author). 
60 Giampiero Alhadeff & Simon Wilson, European Civil Society Coming of Age, Global Policy Forum 
(May 2002), http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/int/eu/2002/05civsoc.htm. 
61 !d. 
62 See Treaty on European Union, art. 4, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) I [hereinafter EU Treaty]. 
63 Roger J. Goebel, The European Union Grows: The Constitutional Impact of the Accession of Austria, 
Finland and Sweden, 18 FORDHAM lNT'L L.J. 1092, 1126 (1995) ("From the inception of the European 
Community, the presidency of the Council has rotated in alphabetical order among the States, each holding it 
for six months."). 
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exists between the E.U. courts, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the 
Court of First Instance (CFI), and the national courts. Slowly, the E.U. courts 
have exerted their supremacy, but that status is unstable.64 A judicial dialogue, 
rather than bottom-down command, has emerged. Added to this judicial web 
is the reference process whereby any "tribunal" may refer an E.U. question to 
the E.U. courts and, hence, may bypass the highest national courts.65 The 
European judicial web is expanded by the opinions of the European Court of 
Human Rights, which, while not an E.U. court, nonetheless contributes to the 
European judicial dialogue. 
The E.U. network includes several national and E.U. administrative 
authorities. Chiti characterizes these authorities according to the "indirect 
administration" model and the "co-administration" model.66 Under the indirect 
administration model, the E.U. authorities are not vested with any power and 
instead rely on the national bodies to attain E.U. objectives. Under the co-
administration model, competences are shared between the E.U. and the 
member state administrations.67 At present, member state agencies (which 
European scholars tend to lump together as "national regulatory agencies" or 
"NRAs") perform much of the European administrative functions. A growing 
number of E.U. agencies (which Europeans call "European agencies" or 
"EAs") have taken on some of the administrative responsibilities, but even so, 
they tend to coordinate with NRAs.68 
64 See THE EUROPEAN COURTS & NATIONAL COURTS: DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE 95-98 (Anne-
Marie Slaughter et al eds., 1998) [hereinafter EUROPEAN & NATIONAL COURTS]. 
65 Consolidated Treaty, supra note 41, art. 234. 
66 Edoardo Chili, Decentralisation and Integration into the Community Administrations: A New 
Perspective on European Agencies, 10 EUR. L.J. 402, 408, 410 (2004). 
67 /d. at 409 . 
. 
68 Chiti notes an "explosion of the agency model" in the E.U. Edoardo Chili, The Emergence of a 
Community Administration: The Case of European Agencies, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 309, 311 (2000). The 
number of European Agencies (EAs) has increased from four in 1993 to fifteen in 2003. /d. It is expected that 
this number will continue to increase. /d. at 309-11. General understanding of these E.U. administrative 
bodies might be built around Geradin's identification of seven common features. Damien Geradin, The 
Development of European Regulatory Agencies: What the E. U. Should Learn from American Experience, ll 
COLUM. J. EuR. L. I, 24-27 (2004). Geradin identifies the following seven features: 
I. Agencies generally have a limited mandate, which is laid down by the establishing legislation and 
consists of tasks of a technical, scientific, and managerial nature. 
2. Most have very limited powers, usually relating to information and coordination, and may not 
issue binding decisions; 
3. All operate under the direction of an executive director; 
4. They have an administrative or management board, usually made up of representative from the 
member states; 
5. They generally function through committees, or committees form some part of their structure; 
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The avenues of policy influence, whether ultimately expressed in what 
Americans would identify as legislation or in some implementing measure, are 
extensive and growing. The above describes only some of the more apparent 
webs in the network. It suffices for this Article to state that relevant policy 
agendas are buffeted by winds from many directions. Policymaking goes 
down, up, and sideways. Different institutions, E.U. and national, have input 
and yet are affected by others. Hence, the E.U. governance has been in the 
process of developing mechanisms to rationalize its policymaking functions in 
network government. 
B. The Simple U.S. Model 
While there is certainly a dialogue between the U.S. government and its 
constituent states, the structure is much more hierarchical and responsibilities 
can be more confidently determined. Because the competences (in European 
terms) are divided between the national government and the states, the 
dialogue is more transparent. Because the policy processes are more 
hierarchical, both within the national and state governments and between the 
national government and the states where cooperation takes place, lines of 
authority and influence are usually easier to follow. 
6. They are decentralized in the sense both that they are withdrawn from the centralized 
responsibility of the Commission and they are located in various parts of the E.U.; and 
7. Most are created under Article 308, the generalized "necessary and proper" provision of the 
Treaty, sometimes in conjunction with more specific authority. 
See id. See generally Consolidated Treaty, supra note 41, art. 308. Although not all agencies have all these 
characteristics, identification of these actual or potential characteristics creates some coherence. See 
Xenophon A. Yataganas, Delegation of Regulatory Authority in the European Union: The Relevance of the 
American Model of Independent Agencies (Jean Monnet Center for International and Regional Economic Law 
and Justice, Working Paper No. 3/01, 2001), available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/Oll 
010301.html (dividing existing agencies into four functional categories: (I) agencies serving the operation of 
the internal market (regulatory model); (2) agencies providing information through a. network of partners 
(monitoring model); (3) agencies promoting social dialogue (cooperation model); and (4) agencies operating as 
subcontractors to the European public service (executive model)); see also Damien Geradin & Nicolas Petit, 
The Development of Agencies at E. U. and National Levels: Conceptual Analysis and Proposals for Reform 
48-49 (Jean Monnet Center for International and Regional Economic Law and Justice, Working Paper No. 
01/04, 2004) (stating that "executive agencies ... comprise all European agencies that are responsible for (i) 
purely managerial tasks ... ; or (ii) observatory roles ... ; or (iii) missions of cooperation"); id. ("[D]ecision-
making agencies ... comprise all agencies that have the power to enact legal instruments ... or ... enjoy 
considerable influence over the adoption of final decisions by the Commission," even though they lack formal 
decisionmakif!g authority); id. at 49 ("Regulatory agencies comprise all European E.U. agencies that enjoy the 
types of powers enjoyed by the NRAs, . . . including a discretionary power to translate broad legislation 
guidelines into concrete instruments."). 
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Throughout its history, the power of the U.S.'s central government over the 
states has been unstable and contestable. In the beginning, the U.S. 
Constitution brought together thirteen "states," which considered themselves 
independent sovereigns. Many of these states, hungering after nationhood, 
reluctantly traded the ideal of confederation for "a more perfect union."69 
Union was in fact a very near thing from the start and continued to be for sixty-
plus years; it had to be settled by the bloodiest war in U.S. history.70 In global 
terms, the U.S. faced, and still faces, a conflict between the intergovernmental 
ideal and the supranat~onal ideal. "States' rights" are well respected in U.S. 
constitutional doctrine and popular opinion.71 The supranational ideal reached 
its peak in the 1970s, and its power has been eroding since.72 
This legal construction of the strong sense of state sovereignty starts with 
the judicial interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
In an early decision, the Supreme Court in Chisholm v. Georgia73 ruled that a 
state could be sued by a citizen of another state in federal court.74 The 
Eleventh Amendment-which withholds federal court jurisdiction over suits 
against a state by a citizen of another state-was very quickly passed in 
response. It took one-hundred years after its ratification for the Supreme Court 
to decide that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits all private suits against the 
states in federal court. 75 Because the limited scope of the Eleventh 
Amendment is expressed in some of the clearest language in the U.S. 
Constitution, the Court had to "find" state sovereignty that transcends the 
actual language of the Eleventh Amendment in the original Constitution.76 
After the Court's decision in Hans v. Louisiana, the seeds of state 
sovereignty grew. In a reaction to an extreme commitment to the central, 
federal government, the Supreme Court evolved a version of state sovereignty 
that limited congressional action as well as protected the states from private 
69 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
70 See Gloria J. Browne-Marshall, Early American Conflicts and Modem African Practices: A 
Comparative Commentary on Constitutionalism, 10 JLSA J.INT'L & COMP. L. 305, 307 (2004). 
71 See Timothy Zick, Statehood as the New Personhood: The Discovery of Fundamental "States' 
Rights," 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 213, 223-24 (2004). 
72 See id. 
73 2 u.s. 419 (1793) 
74 See id. 
75 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I (1890). This protection may be circumvented through the dubious 
device of so-called "officer suits" whereby a state official may be sued to stop implementation of state law 
allegedly violating federal law. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
76 Hans, 134 U.S. at 11-21. 
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lawsuits.77 Some of the law that permitted Congress to "abrogate" state 
sovereignty, which had emerged in the heyday of nationalism, began to 
deteriorate. The Court expanded the constitutional limits on national authority 
so that Congress, not just federal courts, could not derogate state sovereignty.78 
This trend led to two Supreme Court decisions that prohibited Congress 
from "commandeering" state governments. New York v. United States79 
invalidated federal efforts to direct state legislatures, and Printz v. United 
States80 invalidated federal efforts to command state and local executive 
officials. That is, Congress could not force state governments to implement 
federal law. Of particular relevance here, the Court in Printz ruled that 
Congress could not commandeer state officers, even as a temporary 
expedience.81 Since these two decisions, federal administrative programs have 
no longer been able to co-opt state authorities. Instead, if Congress wishes to 
employ state or local administrative officials, it must now induce or coerce the 
states into cooperating.82 
These two rulings solidified the U.S.'s divided federalism. The wisdom of 
divided federalism, however, is much in doubt. U.S. federalism does not exist 
in isolation, and comparisons to other forms of federalism might have been 
useful. As Justice Breyer observed in Printz, 
Of course, we are interpreting our own Constitution, not those of 
other nations, and there may be relevant political and structural 
differences between their systems and our own. But their experience 
may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences of 
different solutions to a common legal problem-in this case the 
problem of reconciling central authority with the need to preserve the 
77 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 502 U.S. 452, 457 (1991); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990); 
Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938); Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71 (1869). 
78 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 ( 1996) (holding that the Commerce Clause, article I, section 8, 
did not authorize Congress to regulate the states). But see Cent. Va. Cmty. Coli. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006) 
(holding that the Bankruptcy Clause, article I, section 8, empowers Congress to affect the states in 
bankruptcy). 
79 505 u.s. 144 (1992). 
80 521 u.s. 898 (1997). 
81 Printz established the principle that Congress may not commandeer state administrative ·officials. ld 
at 935. Printz involved an injunction action brought by two county sheriffs who found themselves in the 
statutory category of "chief law enforcement officers" (CLEO). The sheriffs objected to being compelled to 
implement certain requirements of the "Brady Act," which regulated firearm sales. /d. at 902-{)4. 
82 See id. at 929 ("[This Court] upheld the statutory provisions at issue precisely because they did not 
commandeer state government, but merely imposed preconditions to continued state regulation of an otherwise 
pre-empted field .... ") (distinguishing Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761-62 
(1982)). 
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liberty-enhancing autonomy of a small constituent governmental 
. 83 
entity. 
However, the author of the Printz opinion, Justice Scalia, resisted referencing 
to other systems. 
Several commentators have identified defects in Justice Scalia's 
constitutional reasoning in Printz. 84 The constitutional language in support of 
the anti-commandeering holding is virtually nonexistent. Justice Scalia, who 
has been skeptical, to the say the least, of legislative history in general, based 
his majority oEinion largely on legislative history and "off-stage" legislative 
history at that. 5 Moreover, it is incontestable that the federal-state relationship 
radically and fundamentally changed in 1865, as codified in the Fourteenth 
Amendment in particular.86 As precedent, the case is weakened by the 5-4 
majority.87 Regardless of the skimpy majority, the absence of supporting 
constitutional language, and the vague historical support presented, Printz's 
anti-commandeering principle has passed into U.S. constitutional jurisprudence 
as established doctrine. 
In the end, the supporters of this anti-commandeering doctrine cannot 
escape the charge that it is unabashedly result-oriented, driven by a view of 
good (U.S.) government principles.88 Yet, good government might be 
83 /d. at 976 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
84 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to Commandeer State Courts: 
Implications for the Theory of Judicial Federalism, 32lNo. L. REv. 71 (1998) (arguing that Congress's Article 
I power to employ the state courts also supports the power to commandeer state executive officials). 
85 Printz, 521 U.S. at 928-29. 
86 See CONST. amend. XIV. 
87 Printz, 521 U.S. at 900--01. 
88 Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes 
Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REv. 813, 893-94 (1998). Hills explains: 
/d. 
When the national government commandeers services from nonfederal governments, it 
essentially demands that such governments provide in-kind contributions to the national 
government. But such demands can inefficiently deter voters and politicians from participating 
in state and local politics. In effect, when the national government commandeers state and local 
regulatory processes, it undemtines the very institutions that the national government seeks to 
exploit. 
Ernest Young has observed that federalism design should not only protect the sub-governments, but it 
should also protect individuals through its "dual security." See Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member State 
Autonomy in the European Union: Some Cautionary Tales from American Federalism, 11 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
1612, 1729 (2002) ("While the strength of [U.S.] federalism may have declined in tandem with the danger of 
strife arising from internal differences, it is not at all clear that the need to guard against centralized 
encroachments on individualliberry has likewise decreased."). 
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furthered by giving Congress the flexibility to choose and justify various types 
of state implementation.89 In Printz, Justice Scalia worried that federal 
command of state governments does not show sufficient respect-perhaps 
required by the Constitution-for the state governments.90 In his dissent in 
Printz, however, Justice Breyer observed that other federal systems "do so in 
part because they believe that such a system interferes less, not more, with the 
independent authority of the 'state,' member nation, or other subsidiary 
government, and helps to safeguard individual liberty as well.'.91 The E.U. 
experience suggests that a cooperative-dialectic philosophy may in fact temper 
antagonism between the states and the central authority. Furthermore, it seems 
significant that the E.U. member states agreed to an integrated system because 
they felt such system respected their sovereignty while still getting the job 
done. 
The U.S. hierarchical conception of delegation contributes to the states' 
defensiveness. Even in those programs in which the states "voluntarily" 
participate, there is no question as to which sovereign is dominant. Were U.S. 
federalism constructed more along the lines of a multidimensional network, 
rather than divided and hierarchical, legal doctrine might not have moved 
towards insulating the states. Certainly, one designing or reconstructing a 
federal system elsewhere might take heed. 
89 Daniel Halberstam and Roderick Hills found that rigidity in German federalism prevents more tailored 
design: 'The responsibilities of federation and liinder bureaucracies are defined ex ante by the Grundgesetz 
[the German Constitution or "Basic Law"); thus the German system does not allow for greater or fewer 
enforcement responsibilities to be allocated to the Lander based on any Land's track record of enforcement." 
Daniel Halberstam & Roderick M. Hills, Jr., State Autonomy in Germany and the United States, 514 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 173, 181 (2001). 
90 Printz, 521 U.S. at 907-15 
91 /d. at 976--77 (Breyer, J., dissenting). "Believe" may be the operative word here. As Daniel 
Kelemen's empirical work suggests, 
The impact of fragmentation on state discretion is counterintuitive . . . . Where the power of the 
federal government is highly concentrated, state governments will enjoy wide discretion in 
implementing federal laws. By contrast, where the power of the federal government is highly 
fragmented among a number of veto players, state governments will be subject to more stringent 
controls and enjoy less discretion. 
R. DANIEL KELEMEN, THE RULES OF FEDERALISM: INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY POL!T!CS IN THE E.U. AND 
BEYOND 15 (2004). 
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III. CmZEN EXPECTATIONS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS 
Although federalism analysis usually concentrates on governments and 
people, federal governments actually face a more perplexing challenge: 
satisfying a diverse citizenry. Citizens have expectations and any system must 
be sensitive to those expectations. These expectations are formed from a 
myriad of influences, of which social, political, and legal culture is particularly 
potent and mysterious. For network systems, meeting these expectations is 
extremely problematic. Since ordinary citizens become engaged when policy 
is actually applied to them, implementing machineries must make significant 
contributions to citizen comfort levels. 
In general, implementing policy is developed through two major types of 
actions. The process may focus directly on formulating general and 
prospective policy. This category of implementing policymaking is known in 
the U.S. as "rulemaking" and in the parliamentary governments of the E.U. as 
"delegated legislation" or as "decrees.'m The network devices for 
implementing policy of general, prospective application strain to deal with 
diversity, and hence, new innovations have proven necessary. While the 
procedures discussed below are useful, more development in general 
implementing policymaking procedures for network federalism will be 
necessary. 
Implementing policymaking may also evolve from administrative 
resolutions of individual disputes. The E.U. treaty regime carefully controls 
centrifugal judicial policymaking in individual dispute resolution.93 However, 
U.S. experience teaches that a focus on judicial proceedings is substantially 
underinclusive.94 Necessarily, the vast majority of individual implementing 
disputes are resolved by administrative adjudicators.95 Technically, policy 
confronted by these adjudicators could be submitted to the E.U. courts. 
However, because these administrative agencies are numerous and facially 
carry out member state implementing policy, they are unlikely to be so 
92 While the E.U. is not precisely a parliamentary system, its processes naturally evolve along those lines 
so that an understanding of its general implementing processes is informed by reference to the parliamentary 
model. 
93 The Treaty allows lower national courts to bypass the highest courts and go directly to the E. U. courts. 
Consolidated Treaty, supra note 41, art. 234 ("[A]ny court or tribunal ... may ... request the Court of Justice 
to give a ruling [on a question of E.U.law]."). 
94 See Charles E. Grassley & Charles Pou, Jr., Congress, the Executive Branch and the Dispute 
Resolution Process, 1992 J. DISP. RESOL. I, 1-3 (I 992). 
95 /d. 
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referred. E.U. policy implications are likely to reach only beyond the local 
process if the decisions are reviewed by a court. Again, experience teaches 
that only a small percentage of policies are reviewed by a court.96 So, along 
with processes for generalized implementing policy, network federalism 
presents special challenges regarding implementing policy in individual 
dispute resolutions. 
A. General and Prospective Implementing Policymaking 
For years, Europeans have been considering the advantages of the U.S. 
process for general implementing policymaking, known as "notice and 
comment rulemaking." Francesca Bignarni is among those who have made a 
strong case for transposing that process into the E.U. implementing 
processes.97 However, the E.U. experience suggests that while this process 
may be useful, it is of limited value in the network government. In the end, it 
may even be found that it is simply inappropriate in that context. 
U.S. administrative law has trumpeted for generations its notice and 
comment rulemaking. In the 1940s, the uniform act, the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), adopted that procedure as the basic rulemaking 
process.98 Generally, the process requires public notice of the proposed rule, 
an opportunity for comment, publication of the final rule, and a written 
justification with findings supporting the final rule.99 The final rule is subject 
to judicial review by generalist courts, but that review is generally severely 
limited. 100 Rules so promulgated, "legislative rules," have the "force of law" 
and, hence, are binding on the public, the agency, and the courts. 101 
In the notice and comment process, participation is unlimited. All 
"interested persons" have that right, and that term refers literally to anyone 
"interested."102 Over the years, this process has proven to be a largely cost-
effective mechanism for fostering transparency and open access to general 
96 See James F. Flanagan, An Update on Developments in Central Panels and AU Final Order Authority, 
38 IND. L. REV. 401,430--31 (2005). 
97 See Francesca E. Bignami, The Democratic Deficit in European Community Rulemaking: A Call for 
Notice and Comment in Comitology, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 451,514-15 (1999). 
98 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). 
99 See id. 
100 See James F. Smith, Comparing Federal Judicial Review of Administrative Coun Decisions in the 
United States and Canada, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 503, 535-44 (2000). 
101 /d. 
102 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) C'lnhe agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the 
ru1emaking .... "). 
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policymaking at the implementation stage. It is not without claims of 
procedural paralysis. 103 Nonetheless, the notice and comment process remains 
the bedrock of U.S. regulatory decisionmaking and often leads to important 
policymaking and major policy shifts-results that are perhaps impossible 
through legislative action. 104 Still, other legal cultures, even common law 
ones, have not adopted this procedure, although they are well aware of it. 105 
While a useful device for developing national policy, the notice and 
comment process serves cooperative federalism less well. That is, the states do 
not have any more standing than other "interested persons" because they are 
not the promulgators of national implementing policy. Instead, the E.U. is 
compelled to "privilege" the member states in the regulatory process. The 
member states are direct and active participants both within the E.U. 
government and at implementation stages. 
103 See, e.g., Thomas McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DuKE L.J. 
1385, 1385 (1992) (asserting that "the rulemaking process has become increasingly rigid and burdensome"); 
see also Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency 
Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173 (1997) (calling for a better balance between unbridled participation 
and facilitating deliberation). 
104 One particularly pervasive example is the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's rules that 
completely reorganized the electricity industry, starting with Order 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition 
Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 
(May 10, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.P.R. pts 35 & 385). The Supreme Court addressed the permissibility of 
the agency's actions in New York v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, 535 U.S. I (2002) (holding that PERC policy 
choices were not outside the scope of its authority). Another example is the Social Security Administration's 
rule defining a core element of the disability benefits program. Rules for Adjudicating Disability Claims in 
Which Vocational Factors Must Be Considered, 43 Fed. Reg. 55349 (Nov. 28, 1978) (to be codified at 20 
C.P.R. pts. 404 & 416). The Supreme Court addressed the permissibility of these regulations in Heckler v. 
Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983) (holding that reliance on agency guidelines was consistent with the Social 
Security Act and that such guidelines were not arbitrary or capricious); see also 16 C.P.R. § 423.6 (2007) 
(Federal Trade Commission rule resulting in "care labels" on nearly all apparel); 21 C.P.R. § 101.9 (2006) 
(Food and Drug Administration rule requiring nutritional labels on "all products intended for human 
consumption and offered for sale"). 
Some 4,000 new rules and 3,000 proposed rules are published each year. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND 
BUDGET, 2006 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND 
UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LocAL, AND TRIBUNAL ENTITIES (2006), http:l/www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ 
inforeg/2006_cb/2006_cb_final_report.pdf. Indeed, U.S. agencies produce well over 4,000 final rules each 
year. See id. The Office of Management and Budget's 2006 report to Congress stated that between 1981, 
when it began to compile records, and 2005, 118,375 final rules were published in the Federal Register. The 
annual average would then be 4,375 over twenty-five years. !d. at 29 n.54. 
105 Janet McLean, Divergent Legal Conceptions of the State: Implications for Global Administrative Law, 
68 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 167, 168 (2005) ("For the most part, the ex ante notice and comment rulemaking 
procedures that characterize U.S. administrative law have not been embraced in other common law 
jurisdictions."). 
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With few exceptions, the member states will provide the implementing 
authorities. The E.U. may command the states to do so. Indeed, in the end, 
citizens will likely not perceive that the national regulation was motivated by 
an E.U. measure. In fact, member states do not have "deniability"; hence, they 
have justifiably insisted on active involvement in the development of the 
regulation itself. They participate at every level: from the delegation of 
legislation, through the implementation of legislation, to necessary 
administrative implementation, and the resulting policy. 
Nonetheless, the absence of a clear hierarchy and division of authority 
requires additional participatory devices. One device is the specialist 
committees. 106 The treaty itself establishes committees that must be 
consulted-a directive Americans would characterize as the legislative 
process. 107 These committees bring regions and economically significant 
groups within the legislative process. 108 Similarly, "comitology" committees 
blend expertise and special interests. 109 Formally, these committees monitor 
the Commission's exercise of delegated power to promulgate "implementing 
measures."
110 The committees are forums for discussion and dialogue with the 
Commission. The procedures which govern relations between the Commission 
106 See Michelle Egan & Dieter Wolf, Regulation and Comitology: The EC Committee System in 
Regulatory Perspective, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 499, 513 (1998) (defining "specialist committees" as "a number 
of national specialists in various policy fields"). 
107 Consolidated Treaty, supra note 41, art. 257,263. 
108 !d. art. 257 (The Economic and Social Committee); id. art. 273 (The Committee of the Regions). 
109 Alexandra Gatto, Governance in the European Context: A Legal Perspective, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 
487, 50 I (2006) ("Comito logy strictu sensu defines those committees composed of national representatives 
which assist or control the Commission in the exercise of its implementing powers."). Gatto further explains: 
!d. 
The term comitology, however, has acquired a broader meaning to include not only committees 
which intervene at different stages of the decision making process (the policy-making and 
implementation committees), but also those that provide the opinion of broad socioeconomic 
interest groups (interest committees) and scientific expertise and information (scientific 
committees). 
110 Currently, there are some 247 committees broken into three major categories: advisory committees, 
management committees, and regulatory committees. Under the "advisory procedure," the Commission must 
submit its proposal to a committee but a negative reaction does not affect the Commission's powers. PAUL 
CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, E.U. LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 151-52 (3d ed. 2003). Under the 
"management procedures," the relevant committee must approve the Commission's draft by a qualified 
majority. !d. at 152. Or, the Commission may adopt the committee recommendations and the amended 
proposal proceeds. !d. Even if the Commission does not adopt the committee's recommendations, the 
Commission's proposal may still go forward but the Council is notified. !d. Under the "regulatory 
procedure," if the committee disagrees, the Commission must put its draft before the Council, which may 
reject it. !d. 
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and the committees are based on models set out in the Council's "comitology 
decision" of June 28, 1999. 111 The member state governments are engaged in 
all of these committee processes by, at least, appointing their memberships. 
The committee system overcomes practical obstacles, such as language, 
ethnicity, and resources, to obtain broad and diverse views, as well as to 
incorporate expertise and satisfy member state governments. 
The committee mechanism is not without its problems. Comitology was 
intended to increase accountability, but many observe that, in fact, it has 
decreased transparency and added to the democracy deficit. 112 For example, 
Ian Ward described the comitology system as a "network [that] strengthens its 
own power whilst further distancing governance from the principles of 
democracy, accountability and transparency." 113 Bignami described the 
comitology process as "shrouded in secrecy," because it prevents MEPs from 
checking bargaining within the committees. 114 In Rothmans International v. 
Commission, 115 the CFI attacked the problem of transparency by ruling that the 
committees were under the Commission's control. 116 Despite improvements to 
the committee system, these criticisms persist. 117 Nonetheless, the potential for 
real inclusiveness in network government cannot be denied. 
Formal inclusion of the "civil society" also helps assure that diverse 
interests are included. As discussed above, European governments, including 
the E.U., invite and facilitate participation by the public interest community, 
the civil society, and public interest nongovernmental organizations. These 
organizations, at both the E.U. and national levels, facilitate broad participation 
in implementing policy throughout the network. The danger is that, having 
been brought into the system, these organizations may, to some extent, be co-
111 Council Decision 1999/468/EC, OJ. (L 184) 23, 26 (laying down the procedures for the exercise of 
implementing powers conferred on the Commission), amended by Council Decision 2006/512/EC, O.J. (L 
200) II. 
112 See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Rulemaking in the Ages of Globalization and Information: What America 
Can Learn from Europe, and Vice Versa, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 645, 682 (2006) ("[l]t is unclear that these 
processes, either, result in exposure to or engagement of the public."). 
113 IAN WARD, A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN LAW 68 (2d ed. 2003). 
114 Francesca E. Bignami, The Democratic Deficit in European Community Rulemaking: A Call for Notice 
and Comment in Comitology, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 451 (1999). The Second Comitology Decision sought to 
increase access but with little success. See BERGSTROM, supra note 41, at 271-78. 
115 CaseT-188/97, 1999 E.C.R. U-2463. 
116 Seeid. 
II? STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 6 at 74--75. 
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opted by the governmental institutions. 118 This danger, however, seems 
manageable. Since this device might help solve certain network problems, the 
rewards clearly outstrip the risks. 
It is often observed that the E.U. is a work in progress. The network 
system itself continues to invent new mechanisms. Nowhere is that more 
evident than in "soft law." 119 One major device, particularly relevant to the 
nature of E.U. federalism, is "open method of coordination" (OMC). 120 Under 
OMC, the European Council establishes guidelines, or soft law, in a particular 
area, and the states are obliged to take the ~uidelines into account in 
establishing their domestic policies in those areas.' 1 In doing so, the states are 
to cooperate and learn from each other's experiences. 122 The process appears 
to have been effective, considering that states are cooperating to develop and 
propagate "best practices" based on the guidelines. 123 
Assuming that a network character of a national or supranational federal 
government is desirable or inevitable, the E.U. experiences provide valuable 
lessons. First, it is not enough to formally provide for general public access to 
the process. Obstacles, such as cultural diversity and resource disparities, will 
inhibit inclusion of all the various interests. If affected citizens do not perceive 
a realistic opportunity to influence the formation of regulation, they will not 
perceive the implementation as consistent with good government and, perhaps, 
the rule of law. Instead, governments may establish devices whereby the 
subunits as such are active participants. Specialty representative bodies, such 
118 For example, it has been called "a rigged dialogue with society." Charlemagne: A Rigged Dialogue 
with Society, ECONOMIST (U.S.), Oct. 23,2004, at 31. 
119 Craig and de Burca observe: 'The EC also has numerous soft law methods for developing Community 
policy. These include guidelines, policy statements, and declarations by the European Council." CRAIG & 
BORCA, supra note 110, at Ill n.ii. But they also reflect: "It may be difficult for those affected to understand 
what the 'law' actually is in a particular area. Recourse to informal law may also prevent the Council and 
[European Parliament] from having effective input into the content of the resulting norms." /d. at 117. 
120 D. COYNE, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, INVOLVING EXPERTS IN THE PROCESS OF NATIONAL POLICY 
CONVERGENCE 5 (2001), available at http://ec.europa.eu/govemance/areas/group8/report_en.pdf. 
121 /d. at 56. 
122 For example, notice the "soft law" influence of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development on member states. James Salzman, Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, 68 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189, 219 (2005) (observing that 
OECD studies acquire influence: "[t]he net effect can be a subtle but significant form of advocacy"). Hence, 
Salzman calls for consideration of proper administrative procedures and safeguards. /d. at 219. 
123 This process has been somewhat incorporated throughout the proposed constitution. One example is 
Article III-213, which provides in part: "With a view to achieving [social objectives] ... , the Commission 
shall encourage cooperation between Member States and facilitate the coordination of their action in all social 
policy fields under this Section." Consolidated Treaty, supra note 43, art. III-213. This Article lists seven 
social policy fields in particular. See id. 
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as the various E.U. committees and nongovernmental public interest 
organizations, provide access for various specific categories of citizens as well 
as expertise and perspective. More importantly, they give these interests real 
influence. The E.U. laboratory in network government has advanced the 
understanding of the operation of network government. 
B. Evolving Policy Through Implementing Adjudications 
Many individual claims and disputes must be decided at the implementing 
stage, and the devolution of this authority impacts on these adjudications. 124 
Often, these claims and disputes will be resolved at some administrative level 
or by other specially designated tribunals, rather than through the general court 
systems. The tendency is to view adjudication as primarily a fact-gathering 
process for the purpose of the specific application of general policy, generated 
by either legislative or delegated authority. However, it is the rare law or 
general pronouncement that answers every question at individual application, 
or rather, it is the rare individual application that can be clearly determined by 
hard law. Thus, at the implementation stage, adjudicators, whether judges or 
officials, must tailor the hard law to the case at hand. 125 The aggregate of these 
individual decisions forms a potential source of the implementing policy. 
Different legal cultures treat this source differently. Indeed, legal cultures can 
be distinguished by comparing their treatment of this source. A federal 
system, national or supranational, must confront a potential legal culture clash, 
both horizontally and vertically. A network federal system faces even more 
complicated questions about conduct, equality, and consistency when 
implementing adjudications. 
Again, the contrast between U.S. federalism and E.U. federalism offers 
several insights into the creation of implementing policy in the resolution of 
individual rights and duties. Indeed, the E.U. provides a better study vehicle 
124 A useful working definition: "Adjudication is a determination of individual rights or duties . . . . In 
general, adjudication is the decision making process for applying preexisting standards to individual 
circumstances." CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACfiCE 45 (2d ed. 1997) (emphasis 
added). 
125 Interestingly, Justice Scalia, in Printz, suggested that Congress could require "state administrative 
agencies to apply federal law while acting in a judicial capacity" as a state court would. Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898,929 (1997). His somewhat vague suggestion that Congress could assign policymak:ing to 
state agencies might support the notion that, even in the U.S., the central government could expect state 
administrative adjudicators to participate in the development of federal policy in a given program. See id. at 
928 ("Preservation of the States as independent and autonomous political entities is arguably less undermined 
by requiring them to make policy in certain fields .... "). 
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because it works with various legal cultures. In the U.S., while states vary 
somewhat among themselves and within the federal system in their adherence 
to hard law, in general, the U.S.'s legal culture is to some extent defined by our 
approach to adjudicative policymaking. 126 The E.U., at the very least, must 
deal with two major legal cultures: civil law and common law .127 It has been 
necessary for the E.U. to accommodate those legal cultures at the 
. I . 12s tmp ementmg stage. 
Many federal systems no doubt confront even more complex problems 
when implementing blending approaches to adjudicative policymaking. Many 
federal systems that combine regions or groups that are strongly committed to 
varied or even conflicting notions of "judicial" law-making discretion must 
find the means to deal with fundamentally diverse approaches to implementing 
policymaking in individual disputes. 129 In this regard, the blending of common 
law and civil law systems seems a simplistic analytical vehicle. Still, the 
realities of accommodating even these two approaches to "judicial" 
policymaking are instructive. 
1. Case-by-Case Evolution of Implementing Policy 
A classic distinction between common law systems and civil law systems 
has been the effect of precedent. While the adjudicative process of these two 
legal cultures differs significantly, many find a convergence in the use of 
precedent. 130 Reminiscent of the common law law development, civil lawyers 
refer to precedent, civil law judges recognize prior judicial decisions, and these 
judges use those decisions to guide their own decisions. Indeed, in some areas, 
such as French tort law, code provisions are so general as to invite judicial 
development. 131 Civil law judges are technically free to use precedent as they 
see fit, whereas common law judges technically must rely on precedent or 
explain their failure to do so. 
126 This generalization is confused by the mixed legal system of Louisiana. 
PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD LEGAL FAMILY 257 {2001 ). 
127 There is probably some variation within these overarching categories. 
128 See supra text accompanying note 4 7. 
129 See generally PALMER, supra note 126. 
VERNON VALENTINE 
130 See e.g., Mary Garvey Algero, The Sources of Law and the Value of Precedent: A Comparative and 
Empirical Study of a Civil Law State in a Common Law Nation, 65 LA. L. REV. 775, 775 (2005) (finding that 
"many jurisdictions, both common law- and civil law-based, are gravitating to 'systemic respect for 
jurisprudence' and away from strict use of the traditional stare decisis and jurisprudence constante doctrines"). 
131 JOHN BELL ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW 355-56 (1998). 
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The key theoretical difference is expressed by the term stare decisis. 
Theoretically, common law judges are bound by prior cases. Civil law judges 
have absolute control in their courtroom and are not bound by the work of their 
colleagues. 132 Hence, paradoxically, civil law judges are more powerful in 
their own court rooms but weaker in that their opinions have no impact outside 
their court. Even appellate court decisions are not binding on the lower courts, 
even though the appellate court "reviews" the lower court de novo. The Cour 
de Cassation, the private law supreme court, reviews only law, but even then, 
that court's legal conclusions are not binding on the lower court. 133 In short, 
precedent is not ignored but it does not have a stare decisis effect. 134 
In practice, the force of precedent in the U.S. is much weaker than 
prescribed by theory. The highest courts seem more than willing to escape 
their prior cases. 135 Lower courts often reason around higher court opinions. 136 
The U.S. system is more one of dialogue than hierarchy. In addition, precedent 
is not held to have binding effect in administrative adjudications. 137 
Administrative adjudicative bodies must be consistent, but their decisions do 
not have stare decisis effect. Consistency requires that they treat like cases 
alike or justify any deviation. 138 At the implementing stage, then, precedent 
has an ambiguous force in U.S. adjudications. 139 
In both legal cultures, judges use prior judicial decisions and lawyers refer 
to precedent; still, the impact of prior opinions varies. Civil law judges often 
follow the opinions of their colleagues, and U.S. judges and administrative 
adjudicators often stray from the opinions of theirs. The two systems seem to 
converge in practice even as to this fundamental distinction. Still, culture 
132 ANDREWWESTET AL., THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 56 (1998). 
133 Nicolas Marie Kublicki, An Overview of the French Legal System from an American Perspective, 12 
B.U. INT'L L.J. 57, 66 (1994) (''The Cour de Cassation is not a court of appeals, but rather a court of 
review . . . . The Cour de Cassation blurs the line between advisory opinions and decisions on the merits 
through its initial inability to substitute its judgment for that of the cours d'appel or the cours d'assises."). 
134 WEST, supra note 132, at 55 ("[Article 5 of the Code Civil] makes it clear that the rule of stare decisis 
has no place in French law."). 
135 See, e.g., Malia Reddick & Sara C. Benesh, Norm Violation by the Lower Courts in the Treatment of 
Supreme Court Precedent: A Research Framework, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 117, 124 (2000) (explaining that "[i]n 
[their] study, [they] flou]nd several lower-court rulings thwarting Supreme Court precedent that are ultimately 
affirmed as the Court ovenules the offended precedent"). 
136 /d. 
137 An administrative agency generally is not bound by the principle of stare decisis. See, e.g., Yellow 
Robe v. Bd. of Trs. of S.D. Ret. Sys., 664 N.W.2d 517 (S.D. 2003); Riedmiller v. Harness, 34 P.3d 474 (Kan. 
Ct. App. 2001), review denied, (Mar. 20, 2002). 
138 330 Concord St. Neighborhood Ass'n v. Campsen, 424 S.E.2d 538 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992). 
139 KOCH, supra note 124 § 5.67[4]. 
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matters. It is impossible to believe that adjudicators raised in the two different 
cultures will not approach precedent differently. 
A necessary, and perhaps questionable, aspect of the common law system 
is the inherent unfairness of holding a litigant to law that was created in the 
course of their litigation. Somehow, they are to know not only what the law is 
but also what the law will be. U.S. administrative adjudicators have long had 
the same authority, so that an agency may find a person in violation of a 
standard that was not previously articulated. 140 Although this power parallels 
that of common law courts, it has been contested for generations in U.S. 
administrative law. Many believe that, unlike courts, U.S. agencies generally 
have the power to announce policy through rulemaking and, hence, have no 
justification for applying new policy for the first time in an individual 
adjudication. U.S. legal culture at present trumps this sense of unfairness. 
Nonetheless, the inherent unfairness of this aspect of case-by-case 
evolution of policy implementation may irritate those who expect some 
faithfulness to existing law from their adjudicators. 141 These cultural 
expectations, then, should be confronted as implementing decisions devolve to 
subunit adjudicators. From the public's perspective, the expectation of the 
various groups of citizens must be identified and dealt with. From the 
adjudicators' perspective, some uniform principles must guide their use of, 
freedom from, and development of case-derived law. If an adjudicator, 
judicial or administrative, in a civil law system is faced with an opinion from a 
central adjudicative authority, should that adjudicator treat it the same as one in 
a common law system? Should judges sitting in supranational dispute 
resolution bodies treat case law according to their legal culture, or should there 
be some prescribed or agreed approach to consistency and equal treatment? 
Again, network government makes resolution of these potential conflicts both 
more difficult and more important. 
This choice of case-by-case or unified policymaking is further complicated 
by the sensitivities in national federal systems and by the strength of the sense 
of sovereignty in supranational bodies. For example, some national courts in 
the E.U. system resisted the European Court of Justice's expansion of 
140 Two classic cases are NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969), and SEC v. Chenery Co., 
332 u.s. 194 (1947). 
141 In the context of individual administrative dispute resolutions between a citizen and the government, 
the continental doctrine of legitimate expectation might inhibit retrospective administrative policymaking in 
individual cases. See JURGEN SCHWARZE, EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 949-53 ( 1992). 
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European law. First, supremacy had to be judicially established in the absence 
142 
of expressed supremacy. But that was nowhere near the end. The 
judiciaries of different member states submitted at different rates to this 
supremacy. 143 Indeed, since continental judiciaries tend to be functionally 
divided, different courts systems in the same member state conceded to the 
central judiciary differently. Many national courts still claim authority to 
decide for themselves whether a matter is within European competence.144 
These are expressions of divided federalism much like the U.S., in which 
separate sovereignty is insisted on. 145 The general adjudicative network, 
blending national and E.U. judiciaries in the E.U. policymaking process, needs 
a judicial dialogue rather than a power struggle. 
There seems to be a natural tendency in the formative stages of a society or 
in implementing a program to evolve the detail in dispute resolutions. For 
example, much of E.U. law has been developed through the decisions of the 
E.U. courts. Implementing adjudications in a new supranational organization, 
or an emerging national one, can be expected to rely on individual applications 
to fill out the general law. Yet again, culture matters. At a subsequent 
developmental stage, the legal culture might begin to affect acceptability. In a 
network federal structure, the cultural imperatives can be expected to kick in 
among the groups at different points and in different degrees. And yet, the 
mechanisms for dealing with the cultural expectations are difficult to monitor. 
In the E.U., precedent floats around the implementing network, and 
adjudicators make of it what they might. To what extent will or should an 
official's individual decision in France affect the same E.U. law in England? 
Coming to grips with such questions is a challenge for network federalism. In 
the end, however, diverse expectations must be satisfied or at least 
accommodated. 
142 Case 6/64, Costa v. Ente Nazionale Per L'Energia Elettrica (ENEL), 1964 ECR 1141. 
143 See generally EUROPEAN & NATIONAL COURTS, supra note 64. 
144 Even today, several member-state courts have insisted on the power to engage in ultra vires review. 
/d. at 95-98. 
145 In the U.S., state administrative determinations may control federal authorities. See, e.g., Univ. of 
Tenn. v. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788, 799 (1986). Even when state determinations do not bind federal authorities, 
U.S. folk wisdom is that the states constitute governmental laboratories in which federal policy may form. 
See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the 
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory .... "). In this way, at least, decisions by state adjudicators affect the evolution of federal policy. 
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2. Binding Effect of Language 
A similar complex cultural clash arises from diverse judicial treatment of 
authoritative language as applied in implementing dispute resolution. Again, 
the European and U.S. legal cultures are theoretically distinguished by their 
approaches to language, and again, the reality is more ambiguous. 
Adjudicators in the two systems approach language differently, and it is 
predictable that implementing adjudicators will as well. This cultural 
difference might provide some insight into authoritative treatment of positive 
law in federal systems. 
Theoretically, the ordinary European judiciary should be faithful to the 
language of statutes. The civil law aspect of this prescription grows out of the 
French revolutionary experience, in which the judges abused their power and 
are believed to have prevented the developments that might have saved the 
country from disaster. 146 Many societies that have adopted the civil law 
system have had equally bad experiences with the judiciary and wish to keep 
them under the control of the political institutions. They perceive that limits 
on the judiciary are a necessary aspect of reform. In short, judicial restraint 
and democratic accountability demand that adjudicators honor statutory 
language and, perhaps, policy statements issued pursuant to legislatively 
delegated authority. 
The U.S. has been luckier with its courts and, hence, accepts a good deal of 
judicial policymaking. Of course, the common law culture depends on judicial 
lawmaking. No U.S. lawyer would challenge the observation of Henry Hart 
and Albert Sacks: "The body of decisional law announced by the courts in the 
disposition of these [individual] problems tends always to be the initial and 
continues to be the underlying body of law governing society." 147 U.S. judges 
have acquired considerable freedom from statutory language. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has felt compelled on several occasions to admonish lower 
courts to obey "clear language" and not use the device of interpretation to 
impose their own policy judgments over that of Congress or its delegates. 148 
146 See JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 431 (1968) ('The chief legacy of the [French] 
Revolution was not judicial submission to the discipline of the codes but a deep-seated, widely-held conviction 
that judges lacked lawmaking power."). 
147 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING 
AND APPLICATION OF LAW 163-64 (1994). 
148 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) ("If the 
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to 
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. 
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Despite such optmons, U.S. judges engage in "interpretation"-which has 
none of the aspects of true interpretation-to interject themselves into 
policymaking, and in general, their reach is accepted in U.S. legal culture, if 
not in other segments of U.S. society. 149 
Thus, we might expect implementing adjudicators from the two systems to 
approach authoritative language differently. However, dealing with this 
difference as with case-by-case policymaking requires nuance. John Henry 
Merryman, in his famous guide to the civil law for U.S. lawyers, captures the 
subtlety of the distinction: 
The distinction between legislative and judicial production of law can 
be misleading. There is probably at least as much legislation in force 
in a typical American state as there is in a typical European or Latin 
American nation . . . . The authority of legislation [in the U.S.] is 
superior to that of judicial decisions; statutes supersede contrary 
judicial decisions (constitutional questions aside), but not vice 
versa . . . . If, however, one thinks of codification not as a form but 
as the expression of an ideology, and if one tries to understand that 
ideology and why it achieves expression in code form, then one can 
see how it makes sense to talk about codes .... 150 
In short, judges in civil law systems feel more constrained by statutory 
language than judges in a common law system in which they are expected to 
"make law." 151 More to the point, citizens of different cultures, for example 
Council, 435 U.S. 519, 548 (1978) (noting that the lower courts continued to ignore statutory language after 
admonishment from the Supreme Court by stating that "nothing in the [several relevant acts] ... permitted the 
court to review and overturn the ... proceeding ... so long as the Commission employed at least the statutory 
minima, a matter about which there is no doubt in this case"). 
149 See Emery G. Lee III, Policy Windows on the U.S. Court of Appeals, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 301,318 (2003) 
(finding that "judges possess policymaking discretion when a Supreme Court precedent disrupts a settled area 
of the law and creates legal ambiguity that must be resolved"). 
150 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL 
SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 27-28 (3d ed. 2007). 
151 A civil law judge may engage in "teleological" interpretation, the continental equivalent to U.S. 
purposive approach. See D. NEIL MAcCORMICK & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INTERPRETING STATUTES: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY 511,514,518 (1991). While more activist than many national courts, even E.U. courts 
are reluctant to use this device too liberally. HENRY G. SCHERMERS & DENIS F. W AELBROECK, JUDICIAL 
PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 10 (6th ed. 2001) (finding that "the Court may lay more emphasis on 
some methods than on others. In particular, teleological interpretation, which is rarely used in more traditional 
legal systems"). But see L. Neville Brown, The Linguistic Regime of the European Communities: Some 
Problems of Law and Language, 15 VAL. U. L. REv. 319, 321 (1981) (The Court of Justice "commonly prefers 
a teleological or schematic interpretation of a provision of Community Law; the wording, of course, is not 
ignored, but primary importance is not given to 'les termes.' The Court looks rather to '('object, I' esprit, Ia 
nature' or 'l'economie' of the text under scrutiny."). 
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civil and common law societies, will expect different degrees and perhaps 
types of respect for statutory language. 
These expectations will be further directed by the political system. Even 
English common law judges are compelled to give binding effect to statutory 
language. 152 They must honor legislation with more sincerity than U.S. 
judges. 153 Citizens of the United Kingdom share the parliamentary tradition 
with those on the continent. The separation of the executive and the legislative 
in a presidential system empowers the judiciary to act as arbiters between the 
two. If they are combined, as in most parliamentary systems, the judiciary is in 
conflict with the legislative and executive powers and vulnerable to charges of 
usurping functions that are assigned to the political branches in a democracy. 
E.U. courts are often found to be more activist than traditional civil law and 
parliamentary courts. Partly, this is the result of their French administrative 
court roots. 154 Yet, all but three of the member states are civil law, and all are 
parliamentary in some sense. If culture matters, it is interesting that the 
Council and Parliament have issued "communications" that encourage specific 
rather than general code. 155 Perhaps this development merely manifests a 
cultural instinct for codes. As would be predicted if that were the case, the 
United Kingdom is a strong dissenter to the concept of a European code. 156 
However, it is not farfetched to suggest that the code movement, as it happened 
in many civil law countries, is the result of a cultural aversion to freewheeling 
judicial policymaking. Not only have the E.U. courts assumed a dominant role 
in shaping European law, but their activism has encouraged national courts to 
ignore traditional judicial restraint. 157 Judicial activism may, at least 
subconsciously, offend European expectations. It would then be predicted that 
traditional and, perhaps, new devices will emerge to reassert democratic 
152 See WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 29 ( 1994) (''The sovereignty of 
Parliament ... exerts a constant and powerful influence. [l]t is an ever-present threat to the position of the 
courts ... inclin[ing] the judges towards caution in their attitude to the executive, since Parliament is 
effectively under the executive's control.") 
153 See id. 
154 See, e.g., ANDREW WEST ET AL., THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 54 (1998) ("In Administrative law, 
however, fewer of the rules of substantive law are found in legislative texts, and the role of the judges has 
therefore, of necessity, been more creative."). 
155 Mel Kenny, Constructing a European Civil Code: Quis Custodietlpsos Custodes?, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. 
L. 775' 787-94 (2006). 
156 See id. at 792 ("[T]he common law reactions were the least enthusiastic."). 
157 See WALTER VAN GERVEN, THE EUROPEAN UNION: A POLITY OF STATES AND PEOPLES 113-18 (2005) 
(observing and supporting this development). 
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accountability. Regardless, implementing adjudicators will not be in position 
to challenge traditions without repercussions. 
True judicial interpretation implements democratic policymaking; in 
contrast, independent judicial policymaking subverts it. Cultures that are 
unaccustomed to, or even wary of, cavalier judicial treatment of democratic 
action can be expected to see danger. The more autonomous the dispute 
resolution body, the more vulnerable it is to claims of lawlessness and 
trenching on individual rights. In the context of individual adjudications, 
faithfulness to both legislative and regulatory language is fundamental to 
democratic accountability-both real and perceived. The concept of the rule 
of law demands that officials, more than judges, be constrained by positive 
law. At the application stage, people directly affected are likely to resent 
assertion of common-law-type license by their implementing adjudicators. 
The confusion of authority inherent in network implementation confuses 
accountability and can be expected to increase uneasiness. The network needs 
to develop mechanisms for controlling its adjudicators and, at the same time, 
protect its adjudicators from influence. The very stability of such systems 
requires that citizens see that justice is done at the implementation level. 
IV. OVERVIEW 
Federalism in general is a challenge. While the concept envisions a jointly 
beneficial government, the sense of joint enterprise deteriorates as generalized 
policy moves down to individual citizens. Ideally, the constituent parts of a 
federal regime should reach some agreement on the development of 
implementing policymaking. But a government that mixes social, political, 
and legal cultures is especially challenged in meeting expectations about fair 
decisions and decisionmaking at the individual-citizen level. Large-scale 
failure to meet popular expectations as to fairness and legitimacy among its 
citizens will ultimately undermine a federal system. While structured diversity 
seems to be the answer, diversity also presents the danger of unequal and 
inconsistent treatment. 
These challenges are magnified in network federalism. A hierarchical 
regime can build a common understanding of fairness and justice, and a 
divided regime allows each subunit to find its own norms that are consistent 
with the expectation of its citizens. The concept of network government 
attempts to legitimize a somewhat chaotic policymaking processes, but this 
chaos is its weakness as well as its strength. Unless a network government can 
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engender a sense of justice and legitimacy as policy is applied to its citizens, it 
will be unstable. This may be the gravest challenge for network federalism. 
